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Abstract. This paper studies opportunistic behaviour in a model of decen-
tralised economic exchange and inadequate institutional framework of formal
contract enforcement. It is shown that (i) when the number of cheating traders
is su–ciently large, inadequate institutions result in a loss of decentralised trad-
ing contracts which suggests yet another explanation of the output fall puzzle
of the recent transition experience; (ii) while being necessary for the attainment
of a Pareto optimal outcome, an adequate institutional framework may not be
su–cient if traders perceive it as inadequate; and (iii) in the presence of ade-
quate institutional framework, even if enforcers are corrupt contractual breach
is deterred when enforcers enjoy strong bargaining power.
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1 Introduction
This paper puts forward a simple framework for analysing the impact of institutions on the
implementation of reforms in the formerly planned economies of Eastern Europe. The insti-
tution under study is formal contract enforcement which is widely regarded as an important
ingredient of well-functioning markets. In the model I construct, an economic exchange is
subject to opportunistic behaviour and may be undertaken in one of two sectors, labelled
‘state’ and ‘market’. The two sectors diﬁer in their trading potential as well as the eﬁective-
ness of contract enforcement. Trade in the state sector is less e–cient than in the market
(when measured in terms of an achievable trade surplus), but the state contract enforce-
ment is more eﬁective in curtailing opportunistic behaviour. In contrast, the market sector
is able to deliver a higher trade surplus, but due to less eﬁective deterrence of opportunistic
behaviour, the higher trade surplus may fail to materialise.
The simple model presented here advances our understanding of salient facts about tran-
sition. Firstly, the analysis suggests that adequate institutional framework|speciﬂcally,
eﬁective contract enforcement which ensures a su–ciently high probability of punishment
for contractual breach|is conducive to achieving a Pareto optimal outcome. Alternatively,
inadequate formal enforcement of contracts is shown to lead to a loss of decentralised trad-
ing contracts, thus suggesting yet another explanation of the output fall puzzle observed in
the initial years of post-communist transition, an explanation which emphasises informa-
tional and legal factors rather than technological ones (Blanchard and Kremer 1997, Roland
and Verdier 1999). Secondly, and perhaps surprisingly, good enforcement per se may not
be su–cient: agents’ perceptions of the inadequacy of the legal system may force the re-
forming economy into an inferior outcome even when the level of enforcement is relatively
high. In the stylised setting of this paper, the perception of the inadequacy of the legal
system arises due to a negative enforcement externality: the higher the proportion of non-
complying agents the more di–cult it is to detect non-compliance. In such a case, the
perception of a legal void leads to the highest level of undeterred opportunistic behaviour
1Izvestiia, July 3 1993, cit op Gustafson (1999, p. 151).
1in the economy which, if combined with a large number of opportunists, forces honest
agents to avoid the market altogether. The higher the enforcement externality, the higher
the level of enforcement required to achieve a Pareto optimal outcome. For a su–ciently
high enforcement externality, the perception of legal inadequacy has the most damaging
eﬁect: even the highest level of enforcement will not su–ce to achieve the good equilibrium,
because the ﬂxed resources devoted to enforcement are spread too thinly for the number
of non-complying agents. The analysis therefore suggests that some of the government’s
reform eﬁort in transition should be directed towards both improving the adequacy as well
as the perception of adequacy of the legal system to support markets.2
Finally, observers of the transition experience agree that wide-spread, and in some
cases endemic, corruption played a critical role when reform eﬁorts in Eastern Europe were
deemed unsatisfactory.3 I therefore supplement the analysis of contract enforcement in a
decentralised setting with a study of corruption. The ﬂndings presented here suggest that,
other things equal, a Pareto optimal outcome is more di–cult to achieve when enforcers are
corruptible. In such a case, the strong enforcement of contracts must be complemented with
a high enough number of honest enforcers, for the good equilibrium to exist. The analysis
also uncovers the following surprising but intuitive result: when all enforcers are corrupt and
enjoy strong bargaining power, but the enforcement institution itself is relatively eﬁective
in terms of a su–ciently high probability of breach detection, the Pareto optimal outcome
exists as a unique equilibrium. In such a case, the opportunistic behaviour of suppliers is
deterred because it is cheaper to honour the contract than engage in a bribing game with
a corrupt enforcer. The analysis therefore suggests that strong institutions (e.g. adequate
legal framework for a smooth functioning of markets) have an even greater importance in
the economy with a high corruption level.4
2The positive correlation between the degree of success in liberalisation and a degree of adequacy of the
legal framework in transition economies is well-documented (see Rubin (1998), Gray and Hendley (1997),
and Borish and Noel (1996).
3This is the grabbing-hand paradigm of the state involvement in economic activity (see Frye and Shleifer
(1997) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2000).
4This analysis is also of relevance to the debate about public versus private ownership. The ‘economy’
in the model could be interpreted as a sector of the economy (e.g., health or education), with a part of
the sector operating in the ‘planned’ (or directed) regime and the other part operating in a free market
regime. The model proposed here could therefore be useful for understanding the role of law enforcement or
regulation in combatting fraud and opportunism in the provision of health care, education, and pensions.
2The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The model is introduced in section 2. The
analysis follows in section 3, which ﬂrst considers the benchmark case, then introduces an
enforcement externality, and ﬂnally studies corruptibility of enforcers. Concluding remarks
are supplied in Section 4.
2M o d e l
There are two equally sized large populations of risk-neutral players: buyers and sellers.
In a one shot game, a buyer and a seller negotiate a contract (z;p(z)) whereby the seller
agrees to deliver one unit of a product embodying a speciﬂed value of a quality parameter,
z ‚ 0, and the buyer agrees to pay the price p(z) ‚ 0u pf r o n t . 5 T h en e tv a l u et h a tt h e
buyer obtains from the product is given by U = z¡p(z). Provision of quality costs c(z) ‚ 0
to the seller who gains V = p(z) ¡ c(z) if the contract is agreed. Three levels of quality
are considered: high (z =„ z), mediocre (z = z), and low (z =0 ) ,w i t h„ z>z> 0. The
corresponding costs and prices are: c(„ z)=„ c, c(z)=c, c(0) = 0, with „ c>c> 0; and
p(„ z)=„ p, p(z)=p, p(0) = 0. Also, „ z>„ c and z >c , so that signing a contract for quality
z>0 is worthwhile ex ante. Each player can only sign one contract. The outside options
of buyers and sellers are normalised to zero.
All buyers are homogeneous. The population of sellers contains two types: opportunistic
in proportion ￿ 2 (0;1) and honest in proportion 1 ¡ ￿. The seller’s type is his private
information. An honest seller never fails to honour the contract (say, due to a large ‘psychic’
cost of breaking promises), while an opportunist chooses whether to abide by the contract
depending on the extent of contract enforcement. A contract is breached if the seller fails
to deliver the contracted quality.
The economy is divided into two (productive) sectors: the market (or decentralised)
sector of size „ 2 (0;1), and the state (or centralised) sector of size 1 ¡ „.T h ea s s i g n m e n t
of a seller to a sector is random, while buyers can choose the sector in which to trade. The
two sectors (subscripted m and s) are distinguished by the following two factors. Firstly,
the levels of quality contractible in each sector are zm = f„ z;0g and zs = fz;0g.T h e
assumption captures the idea that the sellers operating in the state sector cannot beat the
market sellers in the level of contractible product quality (for z>0) due to, say additional
5A contractual breach by the buyer (i.e. non-payment upon delivery) is thus excluded from the analysis.
3costs of bureaucratic procedures on writing contracts in the state sector (or other deﬂciencies
imposed by centralised information processing). Furthermore, „ z¡„ c>z¡c, so that (ignoring
the problem of enforcement) a total trading surplus from a market contract is higher than
that from a state contract.
The second factor which distinguishes the two sectors is the eﬁectiveness of contract
enforcement. This is assumed to be greater in the state sector. Again, by appealing to the
centralised nature of contracting in the state sector, contract enforcement of state contracts
is assumed to be perfect and any breach is remedied by speciﬂc performance which forces the
breaching party to do exactly as the contract speciﬂes. In contrast, market sector contracts
are enforced only with some probability ‚ 2 (0;1),6 and the enforcement is facilitated by
reliance damages, d>0, which stipulate a monetary payment from the breacher (seller) to
the victim (buyer) such that the victim of breach is made as well oﬁ as if there had been
no contract. Additional assumptions on the mechanism of enforcement are (i) enforcement
is invoked immediately after the contractual breach has occurred, (ii) litigation costs are
zero, and (iii) dispute resolution is instantaneous.7
The timing of the game is as follows.
(1) Nature determines the type of every seller and assigns every seller to a sector.
(2) Each buyer chooses the sector in which to purchase the product.
(3) A buyer and a seller negotiate a contract. If they fail to agree, then each gets his
o u t s i d eo p t i o no f0 .I ft h ec o n t r a c t( ~ z;p(~ z)) is agreed, the buyer pays p(~ z).
(4) The seller delivers the product of quality z.
(5) If a contract breach has occurred (i.e. if z 6 =~ z), then the contract (~ z;p(~ z)) is enforced
as follows: speciﬂc performance is enacted with probability 1 in the state sector, or a
reliance damage measure is applied with probability ‚ in the market sector.
(6) Payoﬁs are realized.
6‚ captures the situation in which the laws governing contract breach are inadequate or confusing,
judiciary is unpredictable, and/or the information necessary for remedying the breach is partly veriﬂable.
7Assumptions (i) and (iii) are ruled out by the one-shot nature of the model. Incorporation of a positive
litigation cost (relaxation of (ii)) is not expected to change the model’s qualitative results.
43 Analysis
Given the sequential nature of the game, the appropriate solution method is backward
induction: having determined the best strategy for the quality choice by an opportunistic
seller in each sector at stage 4, I consider the buyers’ best strategy for their choice of
contract at stage 3 and their choice of sector at stage 2 given sellers’ choice at stage 4.
The methodology for deriving all the results in the paper is standard, and the proofs of all
propositions are therefore omitted.8 Costly provision of quality implies that the equilibrium
quality in this setting will be determined by the proportion of opportunistic sellers and the
extent of formal contract enforcement. The analysis is restricted to pure strategies. Also,
contractual prices are assumed to be ﬂxed in a way that makes a buyer and a seller willing
to sign the contract:
A A A As s s ss s s su u u um m m mp p p pt t t ti i i io o o on n n n1 1 1 1 c <p<z and „ c<„ p<„ z. (A1)
The state contract price p is ﬂxed by the planner, while the market contract price „ p is
assumed to be sticky due to sellers’ menu-costs. Note that with a sticky market contract
price, buyers’ choice of sector in stage 2 would in general lead to an excess demand for a
given sector. Should this be the case, the buyer’s success (or failure) in achieving her choice
of sector will be determined randomly by Nature, since all buyers are identical. Moreover,
I shall assume that any excess demand for a given sector is absorbed by the other sector:
the buyer who is not successful in obtaining a contract in her preferred sector has the
opportunity to contract in the other sector. This seems to be a reasonable assumption for
a setting in which the price is sticky and cannot adjust in response to excess demand.9
3.1 Benchmark case
When provision of quality is costly, an opportunistic seller in either sector prefers to supply
a lower level of quality than contracted upon. Perfect contract enforcement in the state
sector, however, forces opportunistic sellers to abide by the contractual terms and thus
guarantees that the medium level of quality z contractible in the state sector is delivered.
8The interested reader is referred to Andrianova (2001) for full details of the proofs of the results presented
here, as well as an analysis of an endogenously determined market contract price.
9Andrianova (2001) shows that the alternative assumption|unsuccessful buyers do not have the oppor-
tunity to contract in the other sector|would strengthen the qualitative results presented below.
5Consequently, perfect enforcement implies that the buyer in the state sector will optimally
choose contract (z;p). The payoﬁs to the buyer and either type of seller are:
Us(z)=z ¡ p and Vs(z)=p ¡ c: (1)
Consider contracting under imperfect market contract enforcement. Denote by q =
f0;1g an opportunistic seller’s choice of breach (q = 0) or compliance with (q =1 )h i s
contract („ z;„ p). Under the enforcement regime ‚ with the reliance damage measure d =„ p,
the expected payoﬁs to the buyer and each type of seller, superscripted by ￿ and 1¡￿,a r e :
Um(„ z;‚)=[ 1 ¡ ￿(1 ¡ q)] ¢ „ z ¡ [1 ¡ ‚￿(1 ¡ q)] ¢ „ p; (2)
V ￿
m(„ z;‚)=[ 1 ¡ ‚(1 ¡ q)] ¢ „ p ¡ q ¢ „ c; (3)
V 1¡￿
m („ z;‚)=„ p ¡ „ c; (4)
if contract („ z; „ p) is agreed, or 0 otherwise. (If the buyer and the seller fail to agree on „ p,
it is implicitly assumed that taking her outside option is more attractive to the buyer than
contracting for z =0 . 10)I n t h e a b o v e , q is set by the opportunistic seller so that (3) is
maximised. Given the sellers’ payoﬁ-maximising value of q, the buyer expects to obtain „ z in
all cases except when she is matched with a breaching opportunist (with probability ￿(1¡q))
and she expects to pay the price „ p up front unless the breached contract is enforced (with
probability ‚￿(1 ¡q)). An honest seller complies with his contract („ z;„ p), and thus expects
the payoﬁ given by (4). An opportunistic seller expects to retain the up front payment „ p
unless his breach is enforced (with probability ‚(1 ¡q)), while he expects to incur the cost
of supplying high quality only if he complies (with probability q). In deciding whether to
contract or take her outside option when in the market sector, the buyer takes into account
the sellers’ optimal choice of q and chooses the larger of the two payoﬁs: Um(„ z;‚ j q)o r0 .
The buyer’s equilibrium choice of sector at stage 2 will depend on (a) the fraction of
buyers who choose the market sector, and (b) the size of her payoﬁ from the market sector
contract vis-a-vis that from the state sector contract. Given that any excess demand for
one sector is absorbed by the other sector, the equilibrium allocation of (identical) buyers
across the two sectors|namely „ buyers in the market sector and 1¡„ buyers in the state
sector|is, however, independent of an individual buyer’s sector choice.11
10This can be justiﬂed by assuming that signing a contract involves a small cost. It is clear that an
incorporation of this cost into the analysis will not change the results.
11Andrianova (2001) shows that the same equilibrium allocation of buyers across the two sectors would
6Description of equilibria.
Equilibrium Contracting in Economy trade surplus
which sector?
Strong enforcement
(SE) q =1 s t a t ea n dm a r k e t ( 1¡ „)(z ¡ c)+„(„ z ¡ „ c)
Intermediate enforcement
(IE) q =0 s t a t ea n dm a r k e t ( 1¡ „)(z ¡ c)+„(1 ¡ ￿)(„ z ¡ „ c)
Weak enforcement
(WE) q =0 s t a t eo n l y ( 1¡ „)(z ¡ c)
Consider possible equilibria of the sequential game. Recall that opportunistic sellers in
the market may choose to breach (q = 0) or honour (q = 1) their contract for quality „ z.
Also, seller of either type prefers contracting to no contracting by assumption. Buyers who
end up in the state sector prefer contracting for z to their outside option since Us(z) > 0,
given the perfect enforcement of state sector contracts. Buyers who end up in the market
sector prefer contracting for „ z to their outside option if Um(„ z;‚ jq) > 0, or take their outside
option if Um(„ z;‚ jq) • 0. We therefore have three candidates for equilibria in this game
and these are listed in the table above. Which of these surpluses are attained in equilibrium
is given in the following
P P P Pr r r ro o o op p p po o o os s s si i i it t t ti i i io o o on n n n1 1 1 1 Assume (A1) and let ^ ‚ · [„ p¡(1¡￿)„ z]=(￿„ p). There exists a unique equilib-
rium of the game and it is (i) SE if ‚>„ c=„ p, (ii) IE if ^ ‚<‚• „ c=„ p and ￿<(„ z¡ „ p)=(„ z¡„ c),
or (iii) WE if ‚ • min
n
^ ‚;„ c=„ p
o
.
The intuition behind the proposition is straightforward. A su–ciently high probability of
formal contract enforcement (case 1i) forces opportunistic sellers to comply with the terms
of their contract thus making it attractive for the buyers in the market to contract for
quality „ z. For a given sector size, all beneﬂcial trades are realized in the entire economy.
In contrast, a low probability of enforcement (case 1iii) makes the market contract inferior
compared to the buyers’ outside option and beneﬂcial trades in the market are lost. In
the intermediate equilibrium (case 1ii), the probability of enforcement is high enough while
the proportion of breaching sellers is small enough, so that the combination of these two
parameters makes the buyer’s expected payoﬁ from the market contract for „ z larger than
result even if the market contract price were to adjust in response to an excess demand.
7her outside option and thus induces those buyers who are in the market to contract even
though enforcement is not su–cient to deter breach by opportunistic market sellers.
Fig.1(a) illustrates Prop.1 and suggests that SE equilibrium would disappear if ^ p is close
to „ c. In other words, it is more di–cult to achieve compliance when the bargaining power
Figure 1: Equilibria of the game
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(b) enforcement externality case
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
....... ...... ....... ....... ........ ....... ........ ........
........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ....................... ....................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ...................... ......................
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .
of the buyers is high. If this is so, then even a relatively high probability of formal contract
enforcement is not su–cient to deter breach of market contracts by opportunistic sellers.
Intuitively, when the buyers can extract most of the trade surplus, opportunists do not
have a large enough stake in the contract („ z;^ p)a n dw o u l dp r e f e rt ob r e a c hi te v e nw h e n
enforcement is highly likely.
It immediately follows from Prop.1 that liberalisation of the economy (a rise in „)l e a d s
to a higher welfare when enforcement of market contracts is strong (1i) and/or proportion
of opportunists is low (1ii). Otherwise (1iii), an increase in the size of the market leads to
an inferior outcome for this economy, since a large number of potentially beneﬂcial trades
are lost.
3.2 Endogenous enforcement technology
This section introduces and analyses a negative enforcement externality: because the re-
sources devoted to enforcement are ﬂxed, the likelihood of enforcement will decline with the
rise of the fraction of breached market contracts. Formally, let ‚(q)=‚ ¢ (1 ¡ – ¢ (1 ¡ q)),
where ‚ is the exogenous level of enforcement available in the economy, q is the probabil-
8ity with which opportunistic sellers comply with their market contract, and – 2 (0;1) is
the enforcement externality parameter, introduced to capture ﬂxed resources available for
enforcement. For a given proportion of breaching opportunists, the larger the externality,
–, the lower is the probability of enforcement, ‚(q). By construction, enforcement is more
likely the fewer breached contracts there are: ‚(0) = ‚ ¢ (1 ¡ –) <‚= ‚(1).
As in section 3.1, the following cut-oﬁ value functions are derived for the exogenous level









„ p(1 ¡ –)
· ‚2 then V ￿
m(„ z;‚)jq=1• V ￿
m(„ z;‚)jq=0; (6)
if ‚ •
„ p ¡ (1 ¡ ￿)„ z
￿„ p(1 ¡ –)
· ‚3 then Um(„ z;‚;q =0 )• 0: (7)
Comparison of these three cut-oﬁs for ‚ suggests that, in contrast to the results in section
3.1, the equilibrium may no longer be unique.
P P P Pr r r ro o o op p p po o o os s s si i i it t t ti i i io o o on n n n2 2 2 2 Assume (A1). Then for any – 2 (0;1) there exists a (pure strategy) equi-
librium of the game.
2.1 The equilibrium is unique and it is (i) SE if ‚ >‚ 2 and –<1 ¡ „ c=„ p, (ii) IE if
‚3 <‚• ‚1, or (iii) WE if ‚ • minf‚1;‚ 3g.
2.2 Otherwise, if ‚1 <‚• ‚2 the equilibrium is not unique:
(i) if max f‚1;‚3g <‚• min f‚2;1g then SE and IE equilibria coexist;
(ii) or if ‚1 <‚• min f‚2;‚ 3;1g then SE and WE equilibria coexist.
Fig.1(b) illustrates the proposition for the case when –<1¡„ c=„ p and therefore ‚2 < 1. The
shaded area in the ﬂgure depicts the range of parameters in which the two pure strategy
equilibria coexist: SE and IE in the sparsely shaded area, or SE and WE in the densely
shaded area. Fig.1(b) also highlights the signiﬂcance of the enforcement externality: if it is
su–ciently high (– ‚ 1¡„ c=„ p), then ‚2(￿) shifts out to the level of 1 or beyond, and multiple
equilibria exist for any reasonably high value of the exogenous enforcement level, ‚ > „ c=„ p.
The intuition behind the existence of multiple equilibria is straightforward. In each
region of multiple equilibria (the densely and sparsely shaded areas in Fig.1(b)), both com-
9pliance (q =1 )a n db r e a c h( q = 0) by opportunistic sellers are optimal.12 The negative
externality in contract enforcement leads to a situation in which the equilibrium is deter-
mined by what every seller believes all other sellers are going to do. If a seller believes that
all other sellers are breaching their market contract, then it is unproﬂtable to deviate from
this strategy by complying because compliance is costly (involves cost „ c), while the breach
is detected with a low probability because the exogenously ﬂxed enforcement resources are
spread thinly over the large number of breachers. Similarly, if a seller believes that all other
sellers are going to comply, then his breach of the market contract is costly due to a high
probability of detection: all the enforcement resources in such a case will be devoted to
detecting the seller’s breach.
The argument above yields the following policy implication for transition economies.
Decentralisation of economic activity will increase the size of the market sector, „,w h i c h
in turn will require more enforcement. Citizens’ perception of eﬁectiveness of enforcement
may, however, vary over the sectors. If everyone believes that the market transactions
are unpoliced, then everybody in the market sector will ﬂnd it optimal to breach their
contract, further undermining the public perception of the eﬁectiveness of formal contract
enforcement. The larger the enforcement externality, the more detrimental could decentral-
isation turn out to be because the multiplicity of equilibria is more likely for higher –.T h e
reformers-in-charge could improve the situation by publicising measures which reduce this
externality: e.g. by adopting a tough stance towards all breaches of law. Of course, this
prescription can only be pushed so far as the ﬂxed resources allow it to be credible to the
populace.
3.3 Corruptible enforcers
Suppose that at date 5 Nature determines whether the market contract („ z;„ p) between
a given buyer-seller pair is ‘enforceable’ (with probability ‚) or ‘not enforceable’ (with
probability 1 ¡ ‚). Crucially, the realized state of the world with regard to enforceability
of the contract is now private information of the enforcer (while the value of ‚ is common
knowledge, as before). Thus the source of corruption in market contract enforcement is due
12The diﬁerence between the two areas of multiple equilibria in Fig.1(b) involves the buyers’ choice of
contracting vis-￿ a-vis their outside option when in the market sector and q =0 .
10to the informational advantage possessed by the enforcer.13 A contractual breach, when it
occurs, is remedied by a self-interested enforcer (the supervisor) who may well prefer not
to take any enforcement action in exchange for a bribe from the seller.
If the contract is not enforceable|whether genuinely so or because of corruption in
enforcement|no further action is taken by the enforcer. To maintain the focus on imperfect
enforcement of contracts in the market, I continue to assume that there is no uncertainty
with respect to enforceability of contracts in the state sector (i.e. the enforcer of the state
contract does not possess any private information regarding contract enforceability).14 The
level of corruption in the economy is assumed to be exogenous: a contract enforcer is
corruptible with probability 0 <r• 1 in which case he will accept a bribe b>0i n
exchange for concealing the information regarding enforceability of the market contract.15
Consider the bribe payment which the seller will be prepared to pay to the enforcer in
order to conceal the fact that the contract is, in fact, enforceable. If the enforcer agrees
to conceal, then the seller expects no enforcement at the cost of the bribe payment, „ p ¡ b.
Otherwise, in the absence of a collusive agreement with the enforcer, the seller expects to
obtain „ p ¡ d = 0. For bribery to occur, therefore, the bribe cannot exceed „ p.L e tb = k„ p
with 0 <k<1 representing the bargaining power of the enforcer.
Before calculating the players’ expected payoﬁs in the modiﬂed game, observe that an
honest seller’s expected gain from the market contract („ z; „ p), as speciﬂed in (4), is not
aﬁected by considerations of corruption simply because corruption is only possible once
a contract is breached (while honest sellers are assumed to comply with their contracts
without fail).16 On signing contract („ z; „ p) in the environment with corruptible enforcers,
the expected payoﬁ to a buyer and an opportunistic seller respectively becomes:
Um(„ z;‚;r)=
h
1 ¡ ￿(1 ¡ q)
i
¢ „ z ¡
h
1 ¡ ‚￿(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ r)
i
¢ „ p; (8)
13This seems to be a reasonable assumption in the context of complicated or overlapping legislation with
loopholes, as reported to have been the case in the initial years of reforms in countries of Eastern Europe
(Hay and Shleifer 1998, Rubin 1997, Pistor 1996, Greif and Kandel 1995, Gray 1993).
14Corruption of enforcers in the state sector is also possible and several scenarios can be envisaged to
give rise to a negative spillover eﬁect on the enforcement of market contracts. The results presented in this
s e c t i o nw i l lt h e nb ee v e ns t r o n g e r .
15The analysis of the incentives of the enforcer to get corrupt is therefore left out.
16Allowing for framing or blackmail by enforcers may well reverse this conclusion. See Polinsky and Shavell




1 ¡ ‚(1 ¡ q)[1 ¡ r(1 ¡ k)]
i
¢ „ p ¡ q„ c; (9)
where q is chosen by the opportunistic seller in order to maximise (9), as before. The seller
expects to incur the cost of providing the high quality if he complies with the contract
(probability q). He will keep the buyer’s up front payment, „ p,u n l e s sh eb r e a c h e st h e
contract (probability 1 ¡ q). In the latter case, the breach is either remedied by an honest
enforcer (with probability ‚(1¡r)), and the seller loses the up front payment; or the breach
is not remedied because the enforcer is bribed (with probability ‚r), the seller then loses k
portion of the up front payment. When enforcers are corruptible, the buyer’s gain, (8), from
the contract („ z;„ p)i ss m a l l e rb y‚￿(1 ¡ q) ¢ r ¢ „ p, as compared to the no corruption market
contract payoﬁ (2), namely it is smaller by the expected loss of the up front payment in all
circumstances except when the breach is remedied by an honest enforcer.
P P P Pr r r ro o o op p p po o o os s s si i i it t t ti i i io o o on n n n3 3 3 3 Assume (A1) and 0 <k<1. Then there exists a unique (pure strategy)
equilibrium of the game with corruptible enforcers and it is WE equilibrium, unless
(i) ‚>„ c=[„ p(1¡r(1¡k))] and r • min f[„ p¡ „ c]=[„ p(1¡k)]; 1g, in which case it is SE; or
(ii) [„ p ¡ (1 ¡ ￿)„ z]=[￿„ p(1 ¡ r)] <‚• „ c=[„ p(1 ¡ r(1 ¡ k))], ￿<(„ z ¡ „ p)=(„ z ¡ „ c),a n d
r<[„ z ¡ „ p ¡ ￿(„ z ¡ „ c)]=[„ z ¡ „ p ¡ ￿(„ z ¡ „ c)+k(„ p ¡ (1 ¡ ￿)„ z)], in which case it is IE.
The intuition behind Prop.3 is simple. For buyers to prefer contracting in the market to
their outside option, enforceability of contract („ z; „ p) must be su–ciently high, as in either
3i or 3ii. In addition, for an opportunistic seller to prefer compliance, and thus for SE
equilibrium to exist cost of breach must be large enough (e.g. the number of corruptible
enforcers is relatively small). As before, in IE equilibrium some contract enforceability per
se is not su–cient to deter breach by all opportunistic sellers in the market; the buyers
however prefer market contracting because the expected value of („ z; „ p)c o n t r a c ti sh i g h e r
than their outside option. In the environment with corruptible enforcers, this would be the
case when both the proportion of breaching sellers as well as the level of corruption among
the enforcers is small enough. When neither of these two scenarios is possible, then it is
less harmful for the buyers to opt out of market contracting altogether. Two observations
immediately follow from Prop. 3:
R R R Re e e em m m ma a a ar r r rk k k k1 1 1 1 SE equilibrium is more di–cult to sustain when enforcers are corrupt.
12The proof is a straightforward comparison of the cut-oﬁ in the statement of Prop.3(i) with its
analogue in the no-corruption environment of section 3.1, „ c=^ p. Clearly, the former exceeds
the no-corruption cut-oﬁ for any 0 <k<1a n d0<r• 1. The remark implies that when
contract enforcers are corruptible the institution of formal contract enforcement needs to
be more eﬁective (the probability that the contract is enforceable has to be higher) for
opportunistic sellers to choose compliance in equilibrium.
R R R Re e e em m m ma a a ar r r rk k k k2 2 2 2 Assume (A1) and r =1 . If additionally k>„ c=„ p, then SE equilibrium prevails
despite the high level of corruption in enforcement of market contracts.
Intuitively, breach of market contracts will not occur when all enforcers are corrupt, have
su–ciently strong bargaining power, and are large in number. To check this result, note
that by Prop.3(i), in the speciﬂed range of parameters the opportunistic sellers optimise
by setting q = 1, thus making the buyers in the market to prefer contract („ z; „ p)o v e rt h e i r
outside option. The key to understanding this result is the strong bargaining power enjoyed
by the corrupt market contract enforcer when formal enforcement is relatively eﬁective (‚
is high enough): since all enforcers are corrupt, a breached contract is certain to attract an
enforcer’s demand for a bribe (due to r = 1), and thus the breaching seller stands to lose a
large part of the gain from his breach (due to k>„ c=„ p). It is cheaper for the seller to comply
with his market contract than to get involved in the bribing game. Hence, corruptibility
of enforcers who can extract large bribes serves as a deterrent to contract breach. This
result highlights the relative importance of strengthening formal institutions in an economy
with a high level of corruption (i.e, increasing the value of ‚ above the threshold given
by Prop.3(i)). An improvement in formal institutions supporting markets is beneﬂcial in
curbing opportunistic behaviour of both private agents (sellers) as well as holders of public
o–ce (enforcers).
4 Concluding comments
The results of this paper highlight the importance of institutions for the transition from
plan to market: absent or inadequate institutions lead to a loss of beneﬂcial decentralised
contracts. Moreover, when formal contract enforcement exhibits a negative externality, then
even for a relatively large amount of ﬂxed resources devoted to enforcement bad equilibrium
may prevail, because the equilibrium is determined by trader’s perception of the eﬁectiveness
13of enforcement. The larger the externality, the harder it is to achieve the good equilibrium in
which all traders comply with their contractual obligations. The eﬁect of a large externality
on the welfare of the economy is indirect and feeds through the overall trading surplus.
The larger the size of the market, the higher is the proportion of the beneﬂcial trades
which are lost in the weak enforcement equilibrium. This conclusion is likely to become
even more grim if we accept that a large-scale change in the organisation of economic
activity (e.g., a change from ‘plan to market’) is likely to require new laws which are
better suited to the new economic order. In the notation of the model this means that
the probability of enforcement, ‚, may decline (or the enforcement externality, –,r i s e )
due to, perhaps a perception of, inadequacy of the old legal framework. And this, as the
epigraph to this paper suggests, seems to be exactly what has happened in some transition
economies. Perhaps more importantly, the analysis also suggests that institutions to support
market interaction have a ﬂrst order eﬁect on the success of liberalisation in an environment
of endemic corruption. This is because (a) corruption makes the good equilibrium less
feasible, and (b) an eﬁective legal framework helps to curb the high level of corruption in
enforcement, as well as opportunism in contracting, by exposing the breacher to extortionary
bribe demands of the enforcer.
The simple nature of the model presented here oﬁers a number of fruitful avenues
for future research. Firstly, allowing for repeated interaction could help evaluate the
relative signiﬂcance of formal mechanisms of enforcement versus informal ones. Survey-
based evidence for the reforming economies of Eastern Europe (McMillan and Woodruﬁ
(1999b, 1999a, 2000) and Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruﬁ (2000)) indicates that inad-
equacy of the legal infrastructure of laws, courts and police inherited from the years of
directives and planning forces businesses to rely on reputation (e.g., gossip, social and/or
business networks). Informal enforcement supported by information sharing cannot how-
ever substitute for formal enforcement entirely: while reputation helps to sustain established
trading partnerships, eﬁective courts encourage formation of new relationships by lowering
switching costs and reducing risks.17 These empirical ﬂndings therefore call for a detailed
theoretical analysis of the relative merits of a particular enforcement mechanism in diﬁerent
17Note, however, that the results presented in section 3.2 suggest that reliance on a reputational mech-
anism such as trust to support cooperation when formal enforcement mechanisms are ineﬁective may be
problematic: if economic agents believe there is a high probability of opportunism, then lack of formal
institutions combined with lack of trust will force the economy into a bad equilibrium.
14types of economic environment.18 Secondly, the issue of ﬂnancing formal enforcement, e.g.
by means of taxes, could be studied. The existing literature suggests19 that excessive taxa-
tion is typically the reason for the growth of the uno–cial economy, which in some notable
instances has led to the rise of organised crime and further undermined the development of
adequate institutions that support well-functioning markets. Thirdly, the size of the market
could be endogenised: it is natural to think of the market sector size as being determined
by the proportion of sellers who prefer to operate in that sector. This line of inquiry is of
interest for example for an evaluation of a privatisation programme. Fourthly, the eﬁective-
ness of the enforcement technology is likely to be determined by the size of the sector where
it is employed: this would allow a better description of what happens in the economy as
the size of the sector changes (e.g., as the economy liberalises). And lastly, it is of interest
to analyse the optimal (government) allocation of limited resources for enforcement across
sectors. Intuitively, the resources should be concentrated in the market sector, since it oﬁers
a higher return, however, the higher return will presumably attract a larger proportion of
opportunistic traders.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose ‚>„ c=„ p.T h e n V ￿
m(„ z;‚ j q =1 )=„ p ¡ „ c>(1 ¡ ‚)„ p = V ￿
m(„ z;‚ j q = 0) and hence q =1
is optimal, which in turn leads to Um(„ z;‚ j q =1 )=„ z ¡ „ p>0, i.e. buyers who are in the market
prefer contracting over their outside option. The buyers’ choice of a sector is determined by the sign
of the diﬁerence („ z ¡ „ p) ¡ (z ¡ p), which may or may not be positive. Irrespective of the sign, in
equilibrium „ buyers will end up in the market sector and 1¡„ in the state sector. This proves part
(i) of the proposition.
Suppose instead that ‚ • „ c=„ p and hence q = 0 is optimal. Substituting q = 0 into (2), it is
checked that Um(„ z;‚ j q =0 )• 0i f
‚ •
„ p ¡ (1 ¡ ￿)„ z
￿„ p
· ^ ‚; where ^ ‚ 2 [0;1] when ￿ 2





If (10) and ‚ • „ c=„ p, or re-stating, if ‚ • min f^ ‚;„ c=„ pg, then due to Us > 0 ‚ Um(„ z;‚jq =0 )e v e r y
buyer prefers the state sector, but when unsuccessful in obtaining the state contract she will opt out
of market contracting. This proves part (iii).
Finally, when ^ ‚<‚• „ c=„ p,t h e nq =0a n dUm(„ z;‚ j q =0 )> 0, while Um(„ z;‚ j q =0 )c o u l d
be either lower or higher than Us(z). The buyers who ended up in the market sector will prefer to
contract for „ z despite the certainty of the breach by opportunistic sellers. 2
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider all ranges of ‚ which are determined by the three cut-oﬁ values ‚1;‚ 2 and ‚3 deﬂned in
(5){(7). It is easy to check that ‚1 <‚ 2 for any – 2 (0;1); ‚2 • ‚3 if ￿ ‚ („ z¡ „ p)=(„ z¡„ c); and ‚2 < 1
if –<1 ¡ „ c=„ p. The following statements are easily established.
If ‚ • minf‚1;‚ 3g, then the unique optimal choice of opportunistic sellers is q = 0 and buyers
prefer not to contract in the market due to Um(„ z;‚jq =0 )• 0. Therefore, WE equilibrium exists
and it is unique. If ‚3 <‚• ‚1, then for the unique equilibrium choice of q = 0 by opportunistic
sellers, the buyers now prefer to contract in the market due to Um(„ z;‚jq =0 )> 0, thus making
IE equilibrium unique for this range of ‚.I f ‚ >‚ 2 (provided that ‚2 < 1 which is equivalent to
–<1 ¡ „ c=„ p), then the opportunistic sellers’ unique choice at stage 4 of the game is q = 1. Hence,
the buyer will prefer contracting to her outside option irrespective of the sector in which she ends
up. Therefore in this range SE equilibrium is feasible and unique, which establishes part 2.1 of the
proposition.
To check that the validity of the proposition regarding the multiple equilibria, it su–ces to
observe that the choice of action at stage 4 by opportunistic sellers is not unique when ‚1 <‚•
17minf‚2;1g. This choice could be either q =1o rq = 0 depending on the belief of every opportunistic
seller about the choice all other opportunistic sellers are going to make. If q = 1 is played in
equilibrium, then the optimal choice of buyers in the market is to contract for „ z (thus SE equilibrium
is feasible). If the sellers’ equilibrium choice is q = 0, then the buyers’ optimal choice will depend on
the sign of Um(„ z;‚ j q = 0). If it is positive (this would be the case for ‚ >‚ 3) then IE equilibrium
is feasible. Alternatively, when it is non-positive then WE equilibrium is feasible. 2
Proof of Proposition 3
For SE equilibrium, the opportunistic sellers must optimally set q =1 ,w h i c hg i v e sV ￿
m(„ z;‚;r)jq=1 >
V ￿
m(„ z;‚;r)jq=0 and this in turn gives the condition on ‚ stated in Prop 3(i). As previously, when
q = 1, the buyers in the market will prefer contracting to their outside option. Thus part (i) of the
Proposition is proved.
In IE equilibrium, all opportunistic sellers optimally breach their contract („ z; „ p), while the buyers
prefer market contracting to their outside option despite the certainty of the breach by opportunists.
These two conditions translate into the following:
V ￿
m(„ z;‚;r)jq=1 • V ￿
m(„ z;‚;r)jq=0; (11)
Um(„ z;‚;r j q =0 ) > 0: (12)
Writing out the payoﬁs, as speciﬂed by (8) and (9), and substituting the relevant value for q,t h e
two inequalities above result in













1 ¡ r(1 ¡ k)
: (13)
Note that the ﬂrst inequality sign will be true for any ‚ 2 (0;1) if ￿ • („ z¡ „ p)=„ z. Therefore, consider
￿>(„ z ¡ „ p)=„ z: (14)
For the existence of IE equilibrium, the two end points of the range given by (13) must be compatible,
which after re-arranging translates into:
„ z ¡ „ p ¡ ￿(„ z ¡ „ c) >r¢
n
„ z ¡ „ p ¡ ￿(„ z ¡ „ c)+k ¢ [„ p ¡ (1 ¡ ￿)„ z]
o
: (15)
Denoting the term in curly brackets by fDg, the solution to (15) is given by:
If fDg > 0; then r<
„ z ¡ „ p ¡ ￿(„ z ¡ „ c)
„ z ¡ „ p ¡ ￿(„ z ¡ „ c)+k ¢ [„ p ¡ (1 ¡ ￿)„ z]
; (16)
if fDg < 0; then r>
„ z ¡ „ p ¡ ￿(„ z ¡ „ c)
„ z ¡ „ p ¡ ￿(„ z ¡ „ c)+k ¢ [„ p ¡ (1 ¡ ￿)„ z]
; (17)
if fDg =0 ; then 0 <r• 1a n d￿<
„ z ¡ „ p
„ z ¡ „ c
: (18)
It needs to be checked in (16){(18) above that k 2 (0;1) and, if relevant, r 2 (0;1]. Speciﬂcally, since
k>0, the condition D = 0 in (18) implies ￿>[„ z ¡ „ p]=[„ z ¡ „ c], which is a direct contradiction to the
18statement in (18). In (17), fDg < 0t o g e t h e rw i t h( 1 4 )a n dk>0 implies ￿>[„ z ¡ „ p]=[„ z ¡ „ c], which
in turn implies that the inequality with r in (17) has the RHS > 1, and hence is impossible to satisfy
when r 2 (0;1]. Lastly, turning to (16), fDg > 0 implies that either k>[￿(„ z¡„ c)¡(„ z¡„ p)]=[„ p¡(1¡￿)„ z]
and ￿>(„ z ¡ „ p)=(„ z ¡ „ c), or k 2 (0;1) and ￿ • („ z ¡ „ p)=(„ z ¡ „ c). If ￿>(„ z ¡ „ p)=(„ z ¡ „ c) while fDg > 0,
then the inequality with r has the RHS < 0, and thus cannot be satisﬂed for r 2 (0;1]. We are
therefore left with the solution k 2 (0;1) and ￿ • („ z ¡ „ p)=(„ z ¡ „ c) to (15), which together with
r<[„ z ¡ „ p ¡ ￿(„ z ¡ „ c)]=f„ z ¡ „ p ¡ ￿(„ z ¡ „ c)+k ¢ [„ p ¡ (1 ¡ ￿)„ z]g and (13) supports IE equilibrium.
By completeness, in all other ranges of parameters (except those listed in parts (i) and (ii) of the
Proposition), q = 0 is optimal while Um(¢j q =0 )< 0. Therefore buyers in the market opt out of
contracting. 2
19